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MUTUAL INDWELLING
A. J. Cotnoir

Perichoresis, or “mutual indwelling,” is a crucial concept in Trinitarian theology. But the philosophical underpinnings of the concept are puzzling.
According to ordinary conceptions of “indwelling” or “being in,” it is incoherent to think that two entities could be in each other. In this paper, I propose
a mereological way of understanding “being in,” by analogy with standard
examples in contemporary metaphysics. I argue that this proposal does not
conflict with the doctrine of divine simplicity, but instead affirms it. I conclude by discussing how mutual indwelling relates to the concepts of unity
(modal inseparability) and identity (qualitative indiscernibility).

Perichoresis—sometimes translated “co-inherence” or “mutual indwelling”—is an important concept in Christian theology, central to many
historical and contemporary understandings of the doctrine of the Trinity.
The persons of the Trinity are said to indwell one another, and this indwelling constitutes an intimate relationship between them. Perichoresis
is used in different theological frameworks to ground various other aspects
of the doctrine of the Trinity, such as the unity or oneness of the Trinity
or the communication of attributes between the divine persons. This notion of interpenetration or mutual indwelling can seem confusing or even
perhaps paradoxical, but I will suggest that a mereological understanding
of this concept can serve to illuminate perichoresis. To be more precise: I
argue that the relation of mutual parthood can provide a coherent model
of mutual indwelling of the persons on the Trinity.
The concept of mutual indwelling has its roots in the biblical texts, primarily in the Gospel of John, where Jesus is quoted saying, “You may
know and understand that the Father is in me, and I in the Father” (John
10:38). Similarly, Jesus requests in John 10:9–11, “Believe me when I say
that I am in the Father and the Father is in me.”
Following others,1 we may distinguish two versions of the concept:
person-perichoresis and nature-perichoresis. Person-perichoresis regards the
perichoretic relation(s) that holds within the Trinity between the three
persons (Father, Son, and Spirit). Nature-perichoresis regards the perichoretic relation that holds within the hypostatic union between the two
natures (human and divine) of the incarnate Son.
Swinburne, The Christian God, 209n20; Crisp, “Problems with Perichoresis,” 121.
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As Crisp (following Prestige2 [1928] and others) notes, perichoresis was
first used by Gregory of Nazianzen in the fourth century A.D., followed by
Maximus the Confessor.3 It wasn’t until John of Damascus in the seventh
century A.D. that the concept was applied to the Trinity alongside the notion of “interpenetration.”4 By the time of the Council of Florence in 1441
A.D. person-perichoresis had been fully incorporated into orthodoxy:
Because of this unity the Father is wholly in the Son and wholly in the Holy
Ghost, the Son is wholly in the Father and wholly in the Holy Ghost, the
Holy Ghost is wholly in the Father and wholly in the Son.5

But the concept of mutual indwelling is intuitively puzzling. According
to all the usual ways of conceiving of “indwelling” or “being in,” it seems
conceptually incoherent to think that two persons could be in each other.
If I am in my house, then my house is not in me. This just seems to be
a fact about the metaphysics of being in. The puzzling nature of mutual
indwelling was already made plain in the mid-fourth century A.D. by
Hilary of Poitiers who writes:
[It] confuse[s] many minds, and not unnaturally, for the powers of human
reason cannot provide them with any intelligible meaning. It seems impossible that one object should be both within and without another, or that
. . . these Beings can reciprocally contain One Another, so that One should
permanently envelope, and also be permanently enveloped by, the Other,
whom yet He envelopes. . . . We must think for ourselves, and come to know
the meaning of the words, “I in the Father, and the Father in Me”: but this
will depend upon our success in grasping the truth that reasoning based
upon Divine verities can establish its conclusions, even though they seem to
contradict the laws of the universe.6

The underlying conception does seem impossible, contradicting the metaphysical principles of the universe. And yet despite its widespread use in
theology (perhaps even its overuse7), the concept of mutual indwelling
has received comparatively little philosophical attention;8 and the puzzle
regarding its conceptual coherence is rarely examined.9 But without such
Prestige, “ΠEPIXΩPEΩ AND ΠEPIXΩPHΣIΣ in the Fathers.”
Crisp, “Problems with Perichoresis,” 121–123.
4
See Twombly, Perichoresis and Personhood, for a full examination of John of Damascus on
perichoresis.
5
Ott, Fundamentals of Catholic Dogma, 71.
6
Hilary of Poitiers, De Trinitate, iii, 1, in Schaff and Wace Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers,
Vol. 9, 234.
7
Kilby, “Perichoresis and Projection”; Otto, “The Use and Abuse of Perichoresis.”
8
The concept has seen use in philosophical theorizing on the Trinity (e.g., Davis, “Perichoretic Monotheism”; Davis, Christian Philosophical Theology; Hasker, Metaphysics and the
Tri-Personal God, ch. 25; Williams, “Neither Confounding the Persons nor Dividing the Substance”), but almost nothing by the way of analysis.
9
The situation leads Tuggy to complain:
But one suspects that all proponents mean by perichoresis in this context is “whatever it is which makes divine persons combine to make a further person.” Even
2
3
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analysis, there is the real danger that an important theological concept
be rejected as unintelligible, or perhaps dismissed as “divine mystery.”10
But even the greatest and most difficult divine mysteries (e.g., the Trinity
or the hypostatic union) have been subject to unending philosophical
analysis. We can and should agree with Crisp11 that trying to better understand mutual indwelling is a worthwhile enterprise, even if a complete
understanding is “forever beyond us.”12
This article is an attempt to alleviate some of the puzzlement; I argue
that a current formal theory of an ordinary conception of “being in” allows
for mutual indwelling. In §I, I examine a range of possible proposals for
modeling the perichoretic relationship, arguing that they will not succeed.
In §II, I suggest a mereological way of understanding “being in,” by analogy
with independently motivated examples in contemporary metaphysics.
Because I am understanding perichoresis as a kind of parthood, it is crucial
to show how such an understanding relates to the doctrine of divine simplicity. In §III, I argue that this proposal does not conflict with simplicity,
surprisingly, but instead affirms it. I conclude in §IV, by discussing how
mutual indwelling relates to the concepts of unity (inseparability) and
identity (indiscernibility).
I. Varieties of “Being In”
Several different philosophically robust concepts of “being in” are available. I want to distinguish two main groups: the predicational concepts and
the containment concepts. Firstly, for the class of predicational concepts, the
relata of “being in” are objects on the one hand and entities of a higher
ontological category on the other. A paradigm case is the instantiation
relation holding between an object and a property. This is a kind of “being
in,” as when an attribute is “present in” the object it is true of. There is
also the taxonomical relation of kind-membership, as when something
is “one of” or “among” the s, for some suitable kind F. Similarly, there is
the relational “in,” as when a two people are said to be “in love” or “in
a marriage” by virtue of each of them bearing the appropriate relation
to one another. Secondly, there is a class of containment concepts. Paradigm examples of a containment concepts are set-theoretic such as “being
a member of,” or “being a proper subset of.” Similarly, we have plural
if it is true that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit “metaphysically interpenetrate”
(whatever this means) . . . such metaphors simply hide an unintelligible claim.
(Tuggy, “The Unfinished Business of Trinitarian Theorizing,” 170–171)
10
Hilary of Poitiers seemed to think philosophical reflection would not be of any help:
This is a problem which the wit of man will never solve, nor will human research
ever find an analogy for this condition of Divine existence. But what man cannot
understand, God can be. I do not mean to say that the fact that this is an assertion
made by God renders it at once intelligible to us. (De Trinitate, iii, 1, in Schaff and
Wace, Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Vol. 9, 234)
11
Crisp, “Problems with Perichoresis,” 120.
12
van Inwagen, “And yet There Are Not Three Gods but One God,” 243.
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locutions of “being one of” or “being a member of” a plurality of objects,
as when I refer to “one of my children” or “a member of the Beatles.” Perhaps most centrally, we have locational concepts of “being in,” involving
an entity’s spatial location. Finally, there is also the mereological concept
of containment, namely parthood, as when an object is in another by
being a part of it.
One may attempt to understand perichoresis in terms of predicational
conceptions of “being in.” I won’t have much to say against such attempts
as the main aim of this paper is to explore to what extent we can make
sense of mutual indwelling in terms of containment conceptions of “being
in.” But here is a reason to be dissatisfied with the predication conceptions. It is initially plausible that the person-perichoretic relation should
be understood as holding between the persons of the Trinity, who are
themselves of the same ontological category. Predicational conceptions
of “being in,” however, are always trans-categorical—they hold between
entities of different ontological type.13 And this rules out a straightforward
application of instantiation or kind-membership.14 That is, the persons are
said to be in each other, they are not both (individually) “in F” for some
property or kind F. Similar considerations tell against the relational “in”:
it is by virtue of some relation R between the persons (e.g., Heloise loving
Abelard and Abelard loving Heloise) that we say they (jointly) are “in
R” (e.g., “Heloise and Abelard are in love” or “Heloise is in love with
Abelard” etc.).15 As a result, the relevant sort of “being in” would not a
relation between the persons, but rather it would be relation between the
persons and a some relation in a higher ontological category.
None of this is dispositive against predicational concepts;16 but I think
it does provide a pro tanto motivation for exploring containment conceptions thoroughly.
In the remainder of this section, I consider each of the containment
conceptions of “being in” that are best understood; indeed, each has a
formally precise theoretical foundation. I begin by arguing against settheoretic and plural conceptions. I then consider the locational conception.
13
This is clear enough when we are dealing with first-order entities like objects or persons
and their properties which are second-order; and this is all that really matters for the point
being made here. Things are a little more contentious when we are dealing with higherlevel entities like properties and propositions, which presumably can themselves can have
properties. The standard view is that any properties of second-order properties must be
third-order, and so of a different ontological kind. But of course the standard view might be
rejected.
14
But see §IV.
15
Linguistically speaking, the prepositional “in” typically requires the nominalization of
the given relation to serve as its complement. But this should not be taken to mean this sort
of “being in’” is a relation between first-order objects.
16
One might, for example, put forward a relational view according to which Jesus is “in
union with” the Father and the Father is “in union with” the Son. Here the relevant R is the
perichoretic relation of unity itself, and the apparent symmetry of “being in” is explained
away. I will not explore this proposal further; as my aim in this paper is to take the symmetry
of “being in” seriously.
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Finally, I settle on the mereological conception as my key point of departure. I will argue that there is a viable philosophical theory of parthood,
complete with a coherent and consistent formalization, that allows for
mutual parts—distinct entities that are parts of each other. Such a view can
make sense of a perichoretic relation according to which it is absolutely
coherent to affirm that the three persons of the Trinity are “in” the others.
Containment
Set theory is the paradigm case of formally developed conception of
“being in.” Sets are abstract (mathematical) collections which have members or elements; elements of a set are in sets by virtue of the membership
relation. Pure sets have nothing but other sets among their members, or
their members’ members, etc. These are purely abstract. Impure sets can
contain concrete objects (called urelements) as members. Though they contain concrete urelements, impure sets are still abstract.
This fact is a problem for modeling mutual indwelling: sets are abstract
objects even when its members are concrete. In the case of perichoresis, to
model the claim that each person of the Trinity is in the others, we would
need to have it each person is an abstract object in order to be capable of
having members. But this would (should!) be objectionable to those who
think God is a concrete (even if non-material) entity.17 Of course, it is not
unusual for the purposes of model theory to use set-theoretic entities and
relations to represent concrete entities and relations; but for our purposes
(i.e., the philosophical explication of a puzzling concept) the explanatory
value of doing so seems dubious.18
The second main containment conception of “being in” is found in
plural logic. Pluralities are somewhat like sets; they are governed by a
membership relation “is one of”: when x is one of the X s we can think of x
as being contained in the X s (e.g., Ringo is one of the Beatles). There are a
couple of main differences between sets and pluralities: firstly, pluralities
are thought to be concrete when their members are. So for our purposes,
pluralities avoid the main problem with sets. Secondly, pluralities are

17
See Leftow, “Is God an Abstract Object?,” for related discussion, albeit aimed at views
in which essences are abstracta and God is identical to God’s essence.
18
In any case, there are other difficulties. The membership relation of Zermelo-Frankel
set theory (ZF) is not a good model for “being in” because of the axiom of foundation which
entails that there can be no cycles or loops in the set membership relation. (See, e.g.,
Theorem 7X in Enderton, Elements of Set Theory, 206.) Crucially it cannot be that X is in
Y and Y is in X for any sets X and Y. ZF and its descendants are not the only set theories,
however. There are a number of set theories in which the axiom of foundation fails. Nonwellfounded set theories or hyperset theories replace the axiom of foundation with variations
of an Anti-Foundation Axiom which force there to be sets whose membership relation cycles
back on itself (Barwise and Moss, Vicious Circles). For example, sets like A = {B} and B = {A}
are perfectly consistent (Aczel, Non-Well-Founded Sets). Non-wellfounded set theories might
provide a formal setting amenable to modeling a perichoretic relation of “being in”—it may
even show that there is a coherent notion of “being in” that allows for mutual indwelling.
But given their exotic character and the lack of philosophical familiarity, doing so would
serve little explanatory use.
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thought to be multiplicities whereas sets are thought to be singular entities (e.g., my children are many; they are not some singular entity).
But this latter difference is also the main problem with plural understandings of mutual indwelling. The claim that Son is “one of” the Father
will only be coherent on the assumption that the Father is a multiplicity—
that he is a plurality. That’s intuitively and theologically problematic, as
the Father is an individual person.19 Moreover, the Father and the Son
would both have to be multiplicities (because the indwelling is mutual),
and hence the “is one of” relationship would not apply.20
The third main containment conception of “being in” can be found in
logics of location.21 Theories of location analyze the relation that objects
have to the spatio-temporal regions they occupy. Since regions may be
contained in other regions, the objects that have those locations may “inherit” a kind of containment. So, one might define a relation of “being in”
as follows: x is “in” y if and only if the location of x is a subregion of the
location of y. This relation is perfectly compatible with mutual indwelling,
since x is in y and y is in x merely implies that x and y have identical locations, not that x and y themselves are identical. So co-location could serve
as a model of mutual indwelling.
This kind of containment solves the problems with previous notions;
after all spatial containment relates one concrete object to another. However,
if applied as a model of perichoresis, it commits us to certain requirements
on the locations of the persons of the Trinity that are controversial. At a
minimum, it requires that the persons of the Trinity have spatial locations,
which raises a host of controversial issues about God’s relation to spacetime. For example, Hasker claims the divine persons cannot be co-located
because God is non-spatial.22 By contrast, traditional considerations surrounding God’s omnipresence can yield further conflicts.23

19
Perhaps, one could attempt to avoid this by arguing that each person of the Trinity is
both one and many. In fact, some who endorse plural logic also argue additionally for manyone identities (see Cotnoir and Baxter, Composition as Identity). Many-one identity might
seem to be precisely the sort of view Trinitarians need (as argued by Bohn, “The Logic of
the Trinity”), but it leads to unorthodox claims like “there is one God and many Gods” (see
Kleinschmidt, “Many-One Identity and the Trinity,” for compelling arguments against this
view). In any case, it seems as though we should be able to model perichoresis without being
forced to the view that each person is a multiplicity.
20
Of course we can generalize the one-many “is one of” relation to a many-many “are
among” relation defined as follows: the Xs are among the Ys iff every member of the Xs is a
member of the Ys (e.g., my children are among the schoolchildren). But this still won’t allow
mutual amongness since the “among” relation between pluralities is standardly thought
to be antisymmetric: if the Xs are among the Ys and Ys and then Ys are among the Xs then
Xs = Ys. That’s because, like sets, pluralities are individuated extensionally: the Xs and Ys are
identical whenever they have exactly the same members.
21
Parsons, “Theories of Location”; Casati and Varzi, Parts and Places.
22
Hasker, Metaphysics and the Tri-Personal God, 242.
23
Inman, “Omnipresence and the Location of the Immaterial.”
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Mereology
To sum up, we are after a kind of “being in” relation such that the relata are
neither abstracta nor multiplicities. We want a containment relation which
holds between a concrete object and another unitary concrete object, and
which doesn’t require spatial locations for these objects. Fortunately, there
is a formal theory of just such a relation—mereology.
Mereology is the formal theory of parts and wholes; it aims at a precise
account of the parthood relation. Here “parthood” is to be understood as
the general relation holding between entities and their components, no
matter what sort of things they are. For example, the keyboard is part of
my computer, my fingers are parts of my hands which are parts of me, the
number 2 is part of the function 2x + 3. So, the relata of parthood can be
either concrete or abstract.
There are a number of mereological theories in the literature, but according to so-called “classical mereology,” the parthood relation is what
is known as a partial order. That is, the axioms of this theory (typically)
contain the following three principles governing parthood:24
Reflexivity: For all x, x is part of x.
Antisymmetry: For all x and y, if x is part of y and y is part of x, then x
and y are identical.
Transitivity: For all x, y, and z, if x is part of y and y part of z, then x is
part of z.
Here I have followed standard procedure using “parthood” as a relation
that allows for identity to be a limit case. The strict notion, incompatible
with identity, is called “proper parthood.” Pretty clearly, antisymmetry
rules out mutual indwelling between distinct entities; it forces parthood
to be asymmetric in a way that is compatible with only the symmetries of
identity.
Recently, however, the antisymmetry of parthood has come under fire.
Philosophers have put forward a number of purported counterexamples.
Consider the Aleph, a strange object found in the basement of Beatriz
Viterbo’s house in Borges’s story:
I saw the Aleph from all points. I saw the earth in the Aleph and in the earth
the Aleph once more and the earth in the Aleph.25

Sanford mentions this case to suggest that the naïve notion of parthood
does not require antisymmetry.26 As he notes, Borges uses the “in” of
containment and suggests that whatever the Aleph contains is part of it.
24
Of course there are other axioms too. I say “typically” only because there are different
axiomatizations of classical mereology, some of which have these principles as theorems.
25
Borges, “El Aleph,” 151.
26
Sanford, “The Problem of the Many, Many Composition Questions, and Naïve Mereology.”
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Consider also a passage in the Upanishads that outlines the structural relations between Brahman and persons:
In the center of the castle of Brahman, our own body, there is a small shrine
in the form of a lotus-flower, and within can be found a small space. . . . This
little space within the heart is as great as this vast universe. The heavens and
earth are there, and the sun, and the moon, and the stars; fire and lightning
and winds are there; and all that now is and all that is not; for the whole
universe is in Him and He dwells within our heart.27

Other examples can be found in the from the Huayan school of Chinese
Buddhism such as the “Net of Indra”—a net of jewels that stretches infinitely in every direction, but in which each jewel is contained in every
other, symbolizing the interconnectedness of the universe.28
In the recent philosophical literature, a structurally similar example has
been put forward by Tillman and Fowler.
Suppose that the universe exists . . . a thing such that absolutely everything
is a part of it. . . . Assuming there is a unique such thing, let’s name it U. According to a popular view of semantic content, “U exists” semantically encodes a singular, structured proposition that has U itself as a constituent as
well as the property of existing. By hypothesis, this proposition is a proper
part of U. But U is in turn a proper part of the relevant proposition.29

Tillman and Fowler take this as evidence that parthood must fail to be
antisymmetric, a point made also by Yablo.30
A final example involves a time-travel case from Kleinschmidt.31 Clifford
is a dog-shaped statue which was made partly of other statues, including
Kibble—a small statue of a biscuit. But Kibble, too, is made partly of other
statues, including a time-traveling future version of Clifford himself, suitably reduced in size. As a result, it would seem as though Kibble is a part
of Clifford and has Clifford as a part.
All of the above examples are somewhat exotic, requiring some dubitable metaphysical assumptions (the possibility of time travel, the
structured view of propositions with constituents as parts). But it should
be clear that some philosophers have rejected the “classical” view that
parthood is a partial order. In the next section, I will claim that in fact
there are many perfectly ordinary cases of parthood that fail to validate
Chandogya Upanishad, §8.1, in Mascaró, The Upanishads, 120.
See Jones, “Mereological Heuristics for Huayan Buddhism”; Priest, One, ch. 11.
29
Tillman and Fowler, “Propositions and Parthood,” 525.
30
Yablo, “Parts and Differences,” 143. Similar cases regarding parts of propositions are
discussed in Cotnoir, “Strange Parts”; Gilmore, “Parts of Propositions”; and Merricks, Propositions, 166–167.
31
Kleinschmidt, “Multilocation and Mereology.” Similar cases have been proposed
and discussed in Daniels, “Occupy Wall”; Eagle, “Location and Perdurance”; Effingham,
“Mereological Explanation and Time Travel”; Effingham and Robson, “A Mereological
Challenge to Endurantism”; Gilmore, “Time Travel, Coinciding Objects, and Perdurance”
and “Coinciding Objects and Duration Properties”; and Smith, “Mereology without Weak
Supplementation.”
27
28
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antisymmetry. Indeed, there are viable mereological theories that do not
contain antisymmetry as an axiom or theorem.
II. An Analogy: The Statue and the Clay
To explain how a theory of parthood could allow for ordinary cases of
mutual parts, I want to draw on a standard example from contemporary
metaphysics: the statue and the clay it is made from. One major view
among metaphysicians is that the statue and the clay are distinct entities
by virtue of their being discernible from one another. By “distinct” here,
I mean non-identical, where identity is to be understood in the standard
first-order sense. That is, identity is the unique reflexive, transitive, and
symmetric relation that satisfies the Indiscernibility of Identicals:
Indiscernibility of Identicals: For all (qualitative) properties F, if x is identical to y, then Fx if and only if Fy.
The clay and the statue are frequently thought to be discernible: for example, the clay but not the statue can survive squashing; the statue might
be Romanesque, whereas the clay is not; the statue might be badly made
where as the clay is not; the clay may be of poor quality but the statue
might be of very high quality, etc.32 So we may conclude that they are
non-identical.33
But though they are distinct, they still are completely spatially coincident and are made of the same material parts. This conflicts with the
controversial criterion for the identity of objects called mereological extensionality according to which any two composite objects with all the same
proper parts are identical.
Classical mereology is extensional in precisely this way; it stipulates
that objects are individuated by their parts. If two objects are mereologically equivalent, then they are identical. As a result, classical mereology
forces on us the conclusion that objects which are mereologically indiscernible are indiscernible tout court. That is a strong conclusion, indeed.
There are however formal mereologies in the recent literature which
reject extensionality, and they have recently been gaining traction.
Two Kinds of Non-Extensional Mereology
Non-extensional mereologies fall into two kinds. The first are unsuppplemented mereologies, which reject supplementation principles like the
following:34

32
See, e.g., Johnston, “Constitution is not Identity” and Fine, “The Non-Identity of a Material Thing and its Matter.” For an overview of such arguments, and relevant references,
see Wasserman, “Material Constitution”; Magidor, “Arguments by Leibniz’s Law in Metaphysics”; Paul, “The Puzzles of Material Constitution”; and Blatti, “Material Constitution.”
33
Whether such properties that discern the statue and clay are themselves qualitative is
controversial.
34
See, e.g., Gilmore, “Quasi-Supplementation, Plenitudinous Coincidentalism, and Gunk.”
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Weak Supplementation: If x is a proper part of y, there is some part of y
that is disjoint from x.
(Here, by “disjoint” I mean that they do not overlap, i.e., the two objects
have no parts in common.) This principle gives voice to the intuitive
thought that if an object has a proper part it should also have some
other part, particularly one which does share any parts with the other.
Supplementation principles are extremely plausible, and play a number
of important roles in formal mereology.
The second kind of non-extensional mereology are mutual parts mereologies; they reject the antisymmetry principle for parthood. On such a
view, the statue and the clay, though distinct, are part of each other. This
view was first defended by Thomson35 and more recently by me.36 The
statue and the clay, and any other cases of mereologically coincident objects, are perfectly ordinary, non-exotic cases of mutual parthood.
Given the antecedent plausibility of non-extensionalism, it is worth
taking the time to make the case that mutual parts mereologies have
advantages over unsupplemented mereologies for this purpose. Sider argues that if the statue and its matter share the same parts then they must
be mutual parts.37 His argument relies on another mereological principle,
called Strong Supplementation.
Strong Supplementation: If x is not part of y, there is some part of x that
is disjoint from y.
Since the statue and its clay share all their parts in common, there cannot
be a part of one that does not overlap the other, and hence by (the contrapositive of) the above principle, both are parts of one another.
Recently, other arguments have been put forward in favor of mutual
parthood anti-extensional mereology. In past work I’ve put forward a
number of arguments against unsupplemented mereologies by outlining
the key roles supplementation principles play in formal theories of mereology, in addition to arguing that a mutual parts mereology is the best
anti-extensional mereology compatible with universalism.38
There is a sense in which antisymmetry just is an extensionality principle for parthood. Compare three main forms of extensionality:
Extensionality of Proper Parthood: If x and y are composite objects with all
and only the same proper parts, then x = y.
Extensionality of Overlap: If x and y overlap all and only the same things,
then x = y.

Thomson, “Parthood and Identity Across Time” and “The Statue and the Clay.”
Cotnoir, “Anti-Symmetry and Non-Extensional Mereology.”
37
Sider, Four-Dimensionalism, 155.
38
Cotnoir, “Does Universalism Entail Extensionalism?”
35
36
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Extensionality of Parthood: If x and y have all and only the same parts,
then x = y.
All such principles assert an identity between objects that share certain
mereological properties. Antisymmetry has the same form, asserting an
identity between mutual parts. In fact, if a is part of b and b is part of a,
by transitivity we know that every part of a is part of b and vice versa.
Hence, in the presence of transitivity, antisymmetry is equivalent to the
extensionality of parthood.
In short, anyone who is sympathetic to non-extensionalism for material
objects ought to take mutual parthood mereology as a serious contender.
And since parthood is one sort of containment relation between objects
(including concrete objects), it is a good candidate for modeling mutual
indwelling.
A Formal Theory of Mutual Indwelling
Here then is an axiomatization of a mereology that allows for mutual parthood.
Reflexivity: For all x, x is part of x.
Transitivity: For all x, y, and z, if x is part of y and y is part of z, then x
is part of z.
Strong Supplementation: If x is not part of y, then there is some that is
part of x that is disjoint from y.
Composition: For any X s if φ holds of the X s then there is some z such
that z is a fusion of the X s.
The final axiom of Composition is included for completeness since mereological theories typically include axioms that characterize conditions
under which composition occurs. Here, I have simply used a schema,
where φ here can be any condition one likes: e.g., if φ is just the condition
that there is at least one of the X s then the result will be mereological
universalism, or φ might be the more restrictive condition that the X s are
structured in a certain way, etc. Also, z is a fusion of the X s” means “for all
y, y overlaps z if and only if y overlaps one of the X s.”
This theory has many models that allow for mutual parthood. We can
draw these models using directed graphs, with letters at each node representing an object and arrows representing the parthood relation. (Chaining
together arrows also counts as an instance of parthood.) A model of the
statue and the clay, for example, might look like this:
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Here a and b are the statue and clay respectively, and c and d parts of
both.39
Here is another model, this time of three objects, all of which are mutual parts of one another:

This last model is particularly salient for our purposes, since it purports
to have the structure of the perichoretic relations between the persons of
the Trinity. In each case, every person is part of another person who is in
turn part of the first. We can see that every person is a mutual part of every
other person of the Trinity.
These models show that the formal system is logically consistent; there
is nothing contradictory about a relation that satisfies these axioms. And
insofar as we are willing to accept that this axiomatic system represents a
kind of containment conception of “being in,” we have shown that mutual
“being in” is formally coherent.
III. Divine Simplicity
In modeling perichoresis as a kind of parthood relation, the proposal
would seem to run the risk of conflicting with the long-standing albeit
controversial doctrine of divine simplicity. In this section I will outline six
different versions of the doctrine of simplicity, and address each of them
in turn. I’ll argue that on each construal, God can be considered to be
simple even if we accept the mutual parthood model of perichoresis.
The doctrine of divine simplicity has too long of a history to outline
here. Its foremost recent critic is Plantinga.40 But the doctrine also has
many recent proponents.41 There are a number of different things one
might mean by this doctrine, however. Consider:
(1) God is simple by virtue of being immaterial; he has no material
parts.
(2) God is simple by virtue of transcending spacetime; he has no spatial or temporal parts.
39
For convenience we are leaving aside the obvious possibility that c and d have other
parts.
40
Plantinga, Does God Have a Nature? (See also Mullins, “Simply Impossible” and Schmitt,
“The Deadlock of Absolute Divine Simplicity”).
41
Brower, “Making Sense of Divine Simplicity”; Davies, “A Modern Defence of Divine
Simplicity”; Dolezal, God without Parts; Leftow, “Divine Simplicity.”
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(3) God is simple by virtue of being identical to his attributes; he has
no formal or qualitative parts.
(4) God is simple by virtue of being undivided; his divinity is not split
between the divine persons.
(5) God is simple by virtue of being independent; he is not composed
of anything more fundamental than himself.
(6) God is simple by virtue of having no (proper) parts of any sort.
Each of these doctrines are distinct, with (6) being the most general formulation. I want to argue that all of them may be affirmed by those who
accept our model.
Starting with (1), note that in modeling perichoresis as a parthood relation I have not made any assumption that God is made of matter nor that
the parthood relation is restricted only to material objects. Regarding (2),
given that I have not analyzed parthood in terms of spatial or temporal relations, there is no assumption here that God has spatial or temporal parts.
Of course, spatial intuitions often drive judgements about “containment”
or “being in,” but it needn’t be so (compare the examples in §I). Nothing
about this analysis entails that all parts must be located in spacetime, and
so there is no reason to think the view violates simplicity of type (2).
As for (3), we come to the most controversial doctrine of simplicity:
God’s identity with his attributes. This version of simplicity is based
on a background constituent ontology according to which attributes are
themselves parts of the concrete particulars that instantiate them. Contrast relational ontology according to which attributes are not parts of the
concrete things that instantiate them.42 If a constituent ontologist were to
accept that God’s attributes are distinct from himself (or from one another)
then God would have distinct parts and hence would be metaphysically
complex, violating simplicity. Relational ontologists can quite happily accept that God has no formal or qualitative parts, as they already accept
that nothing concrete has such parts.43 As far as I can see, nothing about
modeling perichoresis as a kind of parthood conflicts with (3), and so I
will leave this thorny issue aside.
Now we turn to (4)–(6), the versions of divine simplicity that most directly threaten the current proposal. I will address each question in turn.
Distinction without Division
The question raised by (4) is whether God is rightly thought to be divided
or partitioned into the divine persons; the answer within classical theology

42
The connection between constituent and relational ontologies and the doctrine of
simplicity was made first by Wolterstorff, “Divine Simplicity.” For more details on the metaphysics, see van Inwagen, “Relational vs. Constituent Ontologies.”
43
This is not to say that relational ontologists don’t have any problems in giving an account of God’s attributes, but whatever those problems are, they are not mereological.
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has nearly always been in the negative. Consider the High Medieval theologian Peter Lombard:
Nor is any of the three persons a part of God or of the divine essence, because each of them is truly and fully God and is the whole and full divine
essence and so none of these persons is a part of the Trinity.44

The idea here is that each person of the Trinity should not be thought of
as a part of God, since in the ordinary setting that would imply that each
person of the Trinity is not wholly or fully God. This is intuitively correct, as it appeals to the thought that where there are proper parts, there is a
remainder. (Recall this is the same natural thought that lies behind various
supplementation principles.) God is not divided in this sense.
In modeling perichoresis as a kind of parthood, one might wonder
whether I have run afoul of this idea. Although the model only claims
that the three persons of the Trinity are parts of each other, we also want to
affirm that each person is God. Does this mean that God is divided amongst
the persons? No. After all, each person is itself “included in” every other
person. When it is claimed that the Son is God, it is simply false that there
are other parts of God not included within the Son. And this is precisely
what our model of mutual indwelling secures. The Son is fully God and
the fullness of God is “in” him; that is, the entirety of the Trinity dwells
in him.
Here is another way of illustrating the point. Consider again the relevant model of perichoresis:

Which of the elements of this model is composed of the others? The answer is complicated by the fact that the composition relation here is not
unique—that is, there are X s such that more than one thing that counts
as being a fusion of the X s. In fact, since everything overlaps everything
else in this model, every person counts as a “fusion” of every collection of
persons. The Father is composed of the Father, Son, and Spirit; the Son is
composed of the Father, Son, and Spirit; and the Spirit is composed of the
Father, Son, and Spirit as well. Because they all mutually interpenetrate
one another, they are each “composed” of all the others.

44

Lombard, Sententiarum, I, xix, 5, in Lombard, The Sentences, vol. 1, 108.
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This situation should be sharply contrasted with another mereological
model with three basic elements:

This model is strikingly different in that each of the three basic elements are composed into a fourth thing. That fusion is unique, and has
each of its basic elements as proper parts. In this case, some fourth thing d
is divided among three others a, b, c; in this case, because d has a as a proper
part, there is some remainder of d that isn’t included in a. This is not the
model of the persons of the Trinity I am proposing; let me emphasize—I
am not proposing that God is composed of the three persons of the Trinity,
each of which is a proper part of God. To mistake this model for the one
above would be to misunderstand the main contention of this paper: the
mereological relation of mutual parthood can provide a coherent model of
perichoresis; the mereological relation of composition, however, does not
account for the unity or oneness of God.
Dependence and Mutual Parthood
Now to the question raised in (5): is God composed of anything more fundamental than himself? Consider Anselm:
For, everything which is composite requires for its subsistence the things of
which it is compounded, and, indeed, owes to them the fact of its existence,
because, whatever it is, it is through these things.45

And Aquinas:46
On the contrary, every composite is posterior to its components: since the
simpler exists in itself before anything is added to it for the composition of
a third. But nothing is prior to the first. Therefore since God is the first principle, He is not composite.47

The reasoning here regards God’s ontological priority over all other things.
One of the main motivations for adhering to divine simplicity is aseity,
Anselm, Monologion, XVII.
Compare Summa Theologiae 1.3.7: “Every composite thing is posterior to its components
and dependent on them. But, as was shown above, God is the first being.”
47
Aquinas, Scriptum super libros sententiarum I.8.4.1 in Aquinas, Thomas Aquinas’s Earliest
Treatment of the Divine Essence, 9.
45
46
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the thought that God is not dependent on anything for his existence. It is
frequently thought that composite objects are dependent on their parts for
their existence. So God must be simple, lest he be dependent on his parts.48
This argument for simplicity depends, of course, on the independent
premise that wholes depend or are grounded in their parts—a premise
which has recently become extremely controversial. In recent metaphysics
it has come under heavy attack on a number of independent grounds.
Schaffer has put forward a number of arguments for priority monism—the
view that the whole universe is ontologically prior to its many parts—on
the basis of physical49 and metaphysical50 considerations. Priority monism
is a radical inversion of the usual part-whole dependence order. But recently it has been put in service of the doctrine of the Trinity to preserve
aseity without simplicity.51
Rather than purely inverting the order of dependence, others have
simply denied that dependence and parthood correlate at all. Some argue
that wholes depend on their parts whilst other wholes are prior to their
parts;52 others suggest that the dependence can run either up or down the
mereological hierarchy depending on the kind of part it is.53 Johnston is
explicit about the implications for divine simplicity:
In the tradition of Classical Theism, a paradoxical consequence has been
drawn from this, namely that God is utterly simple, so that his essential
attributes must all be identical, and be identical with him. . . . But these paradoxical conclusions only follow given Thomas’s false assumption that every
composite thing is posterior to its components, and dependent on them.54

So there is generally independent reason to doubt the crucial premise in
the main argument for divine simplicity. A mereologically complex God
need not be dependent on anything.
Such a defense is available to the view of mutual indwelling developed
here. There are really two main options for those who accept a mutual
parts mereology. The first is simply to deny that ontological dependence
tracks mereological parthood. In fact, insofar as ontological dependence
48
See Brower, “Simplicity and Aseity” and Morris, “Dependence and Divine Simplicity”
for more on the relation between the doctrines of divine simplicity and aseity.
49
See also Calosi, “Quantum Mechanics and Priority Monism.”
50
Schaffer, “Monism.” See also Cameron, “From Humean Truthmaker Theory to Priority
Monism”; Esfeld, “Physicalism and Ontological Holism”; Morganti, “Ontological Priority,
Fundamentality, and Monism”; and Trogdon, “Monism and Intrinsicality.”
51
Fowler, “Simplicity or Priority.”
52
See, e.g., Inman, Substantial Priority and McDaniel, The Fragmentation of Being, 212–213.
53
See McDaniel’s (“Structure-Making”) discussion of Armstrong, and especially the neoAristotelians, e.g., Fine (“Towards a Theory of Part,” § 9) and Johnston (“Hylomorphism,”
§ 12) who think that wholes depend on their “constituent” or “structural” parts (like the
mechanical parts of a motorcycle), but whose “decompositional” parts (like the Northern
or Southern hemisphere) depend on the whole. See also Koons, “Staunch vs. Faint-Hearted
Hylomorphism” and Marmodoro, “Aristotle’s Hylomorphism, without Reconditioning.”
54
Johnston, “Hylomorphism,” 679.
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is a kind of metaphysical explanatory relation, we may have even more
reason to be suspicious. Mutual parts would entail a cycle of metaphysical
explanation—a whole grounded in a part that is grounded in that whole—
which may well be regarded as viciously circular.55
A second option would be simply to accept the correlation between
parthood and ontological dependence, and simply accept that ontological
dependence is not itself asymmetric (a principle which has itself recently
become controversial56). If cases of mutual parthood are cases of symmetric dependence, one might well agree with Bliss57 and Thompson58 that
symmetric dependence is not viciously circular. In the case of the Trinity,
then, God would be a paradigm case of an ontologically interdependent
entity without this violating God’s aseity. Everything that is not God is
dependent on God, whilst God is not dependent on anything that is not
God, even if there can be mutual interdependence within the Trinity.59
Evaluating the metaphysical and theological merits of each response
is for another time (though I prefer the first on metaphysical grounds). If
either is successful, though, there is no deep conflict between my model of
mutual indwelling and the the aseity of God.
Two Definitions of Proper Parthood
Let us turn now to the more general doctrine of simplicity raised in
(6)—the claim that God has no proper parts of any sort. (Since God is selfidentical he is an improper part of himself; so (6) must be phrased using
the notion of proper parthood.) But how exactly should we understand
proper parthood?
In mereology, there are two candidate definitions for proper parthood.
Proper Parthood 1 (PP1): x is a proper part of y iff x is part of y and x is
not identical to y
Proper Parthood 2 (PP2): x is a proper part of y iff x is part of y and y is
not part of x
While the former definition PP1 is presumably more common, many authors have relied on the identity-free version PP2, following Goodman.60
In classical mereology, the two definitions are equivalent: PP2 logically
Lowe, “Ontological Dependency.”
See Barnes, “Symmetric Dependence” and Rodriguez-Pereyra, “Grounding is not a
Strict Order.”
57
Bliss, “Viciousness and Circles of Ground.”
58
Thompson, “Metaphysical Interdependence.”
59
Some language used in describing the relations between the persons of the Trinity like
“begets” and “proceeds from” suggests dependence relations in the Trinity. I do not think of
the divine processions in this way, but how such language relates to aseity and ontological
dependence is beyond the scope of this paper.
60
Goodman, The Structures of Appearance. Examples include Casati and Varzi, Parts and
Places, 36; Eberle, Nominalistic Systems; Niebergall, “Calculi of Individuals and Some Extensions,” 338; Niebergall, “Mereology,” 274; and Simons, “Free Part-Whole Theory,” 286.
55
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entails PP1, but the converse entailment requires antisymmetry. So in the
context of a mutual parts mereology the equivalence breaks down, and
there are compelling reasons to prefer the second definition.
The first reason in favor of PP2 as the correct definition for proper
parthood concerns the transitivity of proper parthood. Proper parthood
should be transitive if parthood is, but this occurs only on PP2. PP1 allows
violations of transitivity, as in the following countermodel:

If a is a proper part of b and b is a proper part of a, it will not follow that
a is a proper part of a as that would contradict PP1.
A second reason to favor PP2 as the correct definition for proper parthood is that it, but not PP1, is compatible with Supplementation. Recall
(from §II) that any object that has a proper part must have another part
disjoint from the first. The principle is extremely intuitive; so natural in
fact that many authors have gone so far as to call it analytically true.61
But it would be false on the PP1 definition: the same countermodel as
above can be used. If a and b are mutual parts, then a is a proper part of b
on the PP1 definition. But by transitivity every part of b is a part of a and
hence there can be no proper parts of b that do not overlap a. This sort of
situation does not arise with PP2, however, since no mutual parts are ever
proper parts on the PP2 definition.
This last fact is important, since according to the PP2 definition an entity that has nothing but mutual parts will have no proper parts. To be
a simple is to have no proper parts, and hence entities like a and b in the
above model count as simples. The same holds true, of course, in the threeelement model of perichoresis. Each person has no proper parts (given the
only plausible definition), hence each is mereologically simple.62
One might object: doesn’t this accommodation of divine simplicity
undermine our original claims that the Father is in the Son and the Son
61
Varzi, “The Extensionality of Parthood and Composition,” 110) claims “this principle
expresses a minimal requirement which any relation must satisfy . . . if it is to qualify as
parthood at all.” Simons (Parts, 116) claims that “[Supplementation] is indeed analytic—constitutive of the meaning of proper part.” Similar claims to analyticity are endorsed by Bohn
(“An Argument Against the Necessity of Unrestricted Composition,” 27n3), Koslicki (The
Structure of Objects, 167–168), and McDaniel (“Structure-Making,” 264).
62
This raises the question of whether any person of the Trinity has any non-mutual parts;
for example, an anonymous referee wondered whether the Son has his human nature as a
proper part. As I think of natures as properties, and because I reject constituent ontology, the
human nature of Jesus is not one of his parts. What about other material parts, e.g., the hands
and feet of Jesus? These bodily parts should count as proper parts in the ordinary sense, but
it’s not clear in general how material parthood relations within the body of Jesus as incarnate
Son will integrate with claims about the Trinity. For example, we wouldn’t want to conclude
that God has material parts from the claims that Jesus is God and Jesus had material parts.
Nor will we want to conclude that God has proper parts mutatis mutandis. In any case, these
are interesting issues I hope to write about in future work.
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is in the Father? Can’t we make a similar distinction between “being in”
and “being properly in” on analogy with the PP2 definition? And if we do,
wouldn’t it follow that the Father is not properly in the Son, and the Son is
not properly in the Father?
In short, yes, these definitions are available and they do have these consequences. I do not agree that this undermines our aims, however. Claims
of “being properly in” were not the perichoretic claims to be modeled.
Moreover, we should not affirm that the Father is properly contained in the
Son, nor vice versa, precisely because we do not have the requisite supplementation intuition regarding the Trinity—there is no “remainder” of the
Father without the Son, nor is there any “remainder” of the Son without
the Spirit, etc.63 Mutual indwelling, on the mereological model, allows for
parthood among distinct individuals without division or remainder.
IV. A Disanalogy: Distinctness and Separability
As a model, I think the mereological conception of perichoresis can do
some important philosophical and theological work. However, as with
any model, there will be disanalogies. In this section I discuss one particular disanalogy between the motivating examples (e.g., the statue and
the clay) and mutual indwelling of the divine persons related to the unity
of the Trinity. I conclude by considering some ways of accounting for this
unity, including modal inseparability and constitution.
The key disanalogy concerns the whether the persons of the Trinity
are separable, i.e., whether any of the persons can exist without any of the
others. Augustine thought this inseparability was a straightforward consequence of simplicity: “It is for this reason then that the nature of the
Trinity is called simple, because it has not anything which it can lose.”64
Even in the earliest uses of person-perichoresis for the doctrine of the
Trinity, the persons were thought to be inseparable.
The abiding and resting of the Persons in one another is not in such a manner that they coalesce of become confused, but, rather, so that they adhere to
one another, for they are without interval between them and inseparable.65

Now, there are a number of different kinds of inseparability: it may be
humanly impossible to separate two magnets of a certain strength, or it
may be physically impossible to separate time and space, or it might be
metaphysically impossible to separate the triangular from the trilateral, or
63
If one really wanted to insist that proper indwelling is the correct perichoretic notion,
there are at least two avenues to capture that thought. First, one could simply opt for the
PP1 notion of proper parthood, and would then have to reject transitivity and supplementation (which shouldn’t hold in the case of the persons of the Trinity anyway). Second, one
could follow Cotnoir and Bacon (“Non-Wellfounded Mereology”) and axiomatize proper
parthood directly as merely a transitive relation. On this route, only Strong Supplementation
can be maintained, and entities can be proper parts of themselves.
64
Augustine, City of God, Bk. 10, 319.
65
Damascene, The Orthodox Faith, I.14.11–18.
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logically impossible to separate the truth of a proposition from the truth
of its double-negation. The key question for separability is this: to what
extent is it possible (on some understanding of the relevant modality) for
one to exist without the other?
The persons of the Trinity, as co-eternal, are temporally inseparable;
similarly, as metaphysically necessary they are metaphysically inseparable. By contrast, the statue and clay are clearly separable: one can exist
without the other. The clay is typically made before a statue. There might
be worlds like ours in which the very same clay exists but no statue was
made, or worlds very similar to ours in which that particular portion of
clay didn’t exist and so the same statue was made from a different portion.
As a result, the three persons of the Trinity are more strongly united than
the statue and the clay, and hence mutual parthood is not sufficient to
account for this unity.
This is something of a drawback for the model, as perichoresis is typically intended to function as a means of uniting the persons of the Trinity.
Of course, one can accept the metaphysical impossibility of their separability, by dint of their necessary existence. But this inseparability is not due
to perichoresis; their unity is not explained by mutual indwelling.
There are some kinds of unity that can be accounted for by parthood, as
parthood is a significantly intimate relation. Sider outlines two key ways
in which that intimacy shows up.66
Inheritance of Location: If x is part of y, then y is located wherever x is
located.
Inheritance of Intrinsicality: If property P is intrinsic, then the property
having a part that has P is also intrinsic.
The Inheritance of Location entails mutual parts will have to be co-located;
and this corresponds to a robust notion of spatial inseparability. Of course
this only holds for parts that have locations, and I’ve already questioned
whether this is appropriate for the divine persons in §I. The Inheritance
of Intrinsicality entails every intrinsic property of a part (“P”) will correspond to an intrinsic property of the whole (“having a part that has P”),
and for mutual parts vice versa. The import of this inheritance principle
for the divine persons is that the intrinsic properties of each person of the
Trinity (e.g., “being begotten”) correspond to some other property (e.g.,
“being such that the begotten dwells within me”) intrinsic to every other
person of the Trinity.
While these notions of intimacy and unity may well be philosophically
and theologically important; it should be clear enough that they cannot
carry the whole weight of the unity of the Trinity.

66
Sider, “Parthood,” 70. See also Gilmore (“Sider, the Inheritance of Intrinsicality, and
Theories of Composition”) for discussion.
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Constitution and Separability
There is at least one other sense in which mutual parts are united that
is worth highlighting: in the usual material examples, mutual parts are
united by being made of the same matter.
One of the main rivals to the mutual parthood view makes heavy use
of this shared matter: it’s the view that the statue is constituted by the clay.
Many, following Aristotle, hold to a hylomorphic view of material objects
such that the matter (e.g., the clay) is part of the whole (e.g., the statue),
though not vice versa.67 Such a view accepts the numerical distinctness of
the statue and the clay, but they do not typically accept anti-extensionalism.68 That is because hylomorphic views generally accept that there are
parts (or perhaps “constituents”) of the statue, namely its form, that distinguish it from the clay.
To be clear, this is not the view I am defending here. I do not accept
that there are formal parts (or constituents) that serve to mereologically
distinguish the statue and the clay; they are distinguished by their properties and properties are not parts. Nor do I here undertake a commitment
to a basic metaphysical relation of constitution that holds asymmetrically
between the statue and the clay. The constitution view of material objects
has been put forth (by Brower and Rea) as a model of the metaphysics
of the Trinity.69 Imagine a clay statue is used as a pillar in a cathedral.
Just as the statue and pillar are numerically distinct but made of the same
material stuff (the clay), so too can the Father, the Son, and the Spirit be
numerically distinct but made up of the same immaterial stuff (the divine
essence). But just as the statue and the pillar are (in some sense or other)
“the same material object,” so too are the Father, Son, and Spirit “the same
immaterial object.” Instructive as it may be, the constitution view of the
Trinity has faced a number of criticisms.70
From the perspective of the aims of this paper, it is not immediately obvious how the constitution model can make sense of mutual indwelling.
Though the persons are the “same” in an important sense, there is no
clear sense in which they are “in” one another. One potential avenue is
as follows: one could make use of a predicational concept of “being in,”
in particular the relation of instantiation. Each person of the Trinity instantiates the divine essence, and hence this essence is “present in” each
person. By itself, this doesn’t quite deliver mutual indwelling between the
67
See Fine, “Coincidence and Form”; Haslanger, “Parts, Compounds, and Substantial
Unity”; Koslicki, The Structure of Objects; and Rea, “Sameness without Identity” and “Hylomorphism Reconditioned.”
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Some theorists accept a constitution relation without understanding constituting matter
as a part. See, e.g., Baker, “Why Constitution is not Identity” and “Unity without Identity.”
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Brower and Rea, “Material Constitution and the Trinity.” See also Hasker, Metaphysics
and the Tri-Personal God, ch. 28, for a somewhat different constitution model.
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See Craig, “Does the Problem of Material Constitution Illuminate the Doctrine of the
Trinity?”; Hasker, “Constitution and the Trinity”; and Tuggy, “Constitution Trinitarianism.”

144

Faith and Philosophy

persons, but only a shared essence. To supplement, one might suggest a
kind of systematic ambiguity thesis: so when Jesus says “I am in the Father and my Father is in me” what is meant is that “I [my essence] is in the
Father [the person] and the Father [his essence] is in me [the person].” This
delivers an interpretation of the target perichoretic claims, but seems to
me to be something of a stretch, however. Alternatively, one could accept
(perhaps by divine simplicity) that each person is identical to the divine
essence. If essences are still said to be “present in” the persons they are
identical to, this would deliver the truth of the perichoretic claims. In this
case, though one wonders how material constitution sheds any light on
the underlying metaphysics.
While I think Brower and Rea are right to look for some kind of sameness without identity, I do not think constitution is the right sort of notion.
Sameness of matter (or “immaterial stuff”) is not sufficient for two things
to count as the same material object, because it is not sufficient for inseparability. The statue and the pillar are clearly separable: one can exist
without the other temporally and modally, even though they are constituted by the same matter. The statue might be removed from the plinth in
the cathedral and placed in a museum, thus ceasing to be a pillar whilst
remaining a statue. Or, the sculptor might be unhappy with the shape of
statue, and so take it down and reform the very same clay into a purely
cylindrical pillar, whereby the statue ceases to exist. It seems natural to
think that the degree to which one can exist without the other informs our
judgements about whether one thing is the same object as another. So in
what sense do they count as the same material object?71 In sum, neither
constitution nor mutual parthood is sufficient to account for this deep
metaphysical unity.
It is worth contrasting the aims of this paper with the aims of Brower
and Rea. They set out to provide a metaphysically perspicuous model of
“sameness without identity” to help explain how the three persons of the
Trinity can be one God. My aims were much more modest; I didn’t set out
to solve all philosophical difficulties with the doctrine of the the Trinity. I
merely wished to solve the puzzle as to how any reasonable conception of
being in could allow us to make sense of mutual indwelling. In my view,
Brower and Rea are right that the puzzles of material constitution can
illuminate the Trinity, but not in the way that they suppose.
Unity and Oneness
I still have not delivered a fully adequate model of divine unity; and as
a result, we have not given a full account of the doctrine of the Trinity.
We should not rest content with a mere “social” model of three persons
that mutually indwell one another; critics of social trinitarianism appear
71
Of course this sort of coming-into and going-out-of existence is impossible with the
Father, Son, and Spirit as they are (arguably) necessary existents. But that can’t be the whole
story of their unity; after all, we do not think of, say, the number 3 and the Father as united
simply because they are both necessary existents.
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to be right that perichoresis alone cannot account for the unity of the three
persons. The doctrine of the Trinity requires us to make sense of a deep
metaphysical oneness of God. After all, almost immediately after Jesus expresses his mutual indwelling with the Father, he claims “I and the Father
are one” (John 10:30). In the words of Augustine:
There are the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, and each is God and at the
same time all are one God; and each of them is a full substance, and at the
same time all are one substance.72

I have been assuming throughout that the persons of the Trinity are distinct, i.e., non-identical. This is in part because Trinitarian monotheism
requires one to affirm that there are three divine persons. But it also follows
from the Indiscernibility of Identicals: there are truths about each person
that are not true of the others. So we cannot, I think, ensure the oneness of
the persons by identity.
What is required, then, is a metaphysics of unity that is not tied to qualitative indiscernibility. Of course, this is nothing more than a pointer in a
certain direction. A fully worked-out model of the doctrine of the Trinity
is a long way off. But providing a conceptually coherent model of mutual
indwelling is a good start.73
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